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2.
The Cultural Divide in Europe:
Migration, Multiculturalism, and Political Trust
Abstract
One of the defining features of modern states is their incorporation of notions of political
and social community based on shared language, history, and myths. However, large
numbers of citizens in modern states have come to believe their national communities are
under threat from several modern forces, including immigration. Using the European
Social Survey (2002-2009), this paper explores the extent to which perceived threats
posed by large-scale immigration undermine national political communities by reducing
trust in national politicians and political institutions. The findings indicate that even after
controlling for other predictors of trust in the political system, concerns about the effect
of immigration on the national community have an impact on trust in politics. Moreover,
having a lengthy post-war history with mass immigration mediates this effect, while the
potentially mobilizing effects of far-right parties on the relationship between concern
about immigration and political distrust are somewhat limited.
3Since the end of World War II, immigration has become one of the most divisive issues
on the political agendas of western democracies. Many individuals in European
democracies express unease or outright concern with the potential effects of migration to
their countries while others in these countries are less uneasy or even welcoming toward
newcomers. Ultimately, these divisions are unlikely to be solely about immigration but
also about fundamental questions regarding how the nation-state should be constituted—
does it need to remain closed to outside cultures and influences or can it absorb or
incorporate these? These divisions have implications for voting and party systems,
particularly with the rise of the far-right in many European countries;1 in addition,
research indicates that whichever side of this division holds government power can make
a difference to immigration and immigrant policymaking.2 This article contends that in
the modern mass-immigration states of Europe, such divides also affect how individuals
perceive the key political institutions of their nation-states, as well as the politicians
running those institutions. Specifically, the article argues that public divisions over
immigration affect trust in politicians and political institutions, and that this relationship
is not simply an artifact of general dissatisfaction nor necessarily solely a result of far-
right mobilization activities.
The paper begins by briefly discussing the focus of the analysis—distrust in
politics. It then outlines why divisions over immigration and multiculturalism are likely
to affect political trust. Although this article does not contend that negative perceptions
about the impact of immigration are the only drivers of political distrust—and indeed,
later sections of the article discuss some of the other explanations offered in academic
literature—it is contended here that this is an overlooked variable that is likely to have
significant effects on perceptions of the political system in the modern day. After
4explaining why this is expected to be the case, the article then discusses how contextual
variables may be expected to affect this relationship, particularly history of immigration
and far-right mobilization. The article then discusses the key alternative explanations for
political trust found in the academic literature, and after this, the methods and data used
in the analysis. The hypotheses proposed in previous sections are then tested using multi-
level modeling on the four waves of the European Social Survey. The findings indicate
that even after controlling for other predictors of trust in the political system, divisions
about the effects of immigration on the national community are related to trust in politics.
In addition, it appears that this relationship is partly mediated by the history of migration
to the country: on average, in countries where there has been a long history of post-
World-War-II immigration, the impact of concern about immigration on trust in politics
is stronger than in countries with more recent experiences with being countries of
immigration. On the other hand, the potential for mobilization of concerns about
immigration and political distrust by strong far-right parties is more limited than might be
expected.
Political Trust
Political trust is crucial to effective policymaking, compliance with government
regulations, and engagement in civically moral behavior.3 It is also thought to be crucial
to the representative relationship that lies at the heart of most democratic regimes.4 Thus,
understanding the causes of political distrust is important. What do we mean by “political
trust” or “distrust,” though?
Expressions of trust in a political institution may be affirmations that on average the
agents operating within those institutions will prove trustworthy, or that the democratic
5institutions serve to select relatively trustworthy agents.5 Alternatively, “an expression of
trust in government (or synonymously political confidence and support) is a summary
judgment that the system is responsive and will do what is right even in the absence of
constant scrutiny.”6
Easton’s distinction between diffuse and specific system support is also pertinent to
our understanding of political trust. On the one hand, diffuse support can be understood
as a deep-seated set of attitudes toward politics and the political system that is relatively
impervious to change.7 On the other hand, specific support pertains to the actions and
performance of government or political elites. In a stable political system, it is assumed
that short-term policy failures should not directly erode diffuse regime support or support
for the political community as a whole.
Although this distinction between diffuse and specific support may seem fairly
apparent, measuring it is less than clear-cut. When citizens express trust or confidence in
their national parliaments, presidencies, or governments, does this provide a reasonable
measure of general orientations to institutions and elites or is it solely measuring attitudes
toward current leaders and policies?8 Comparative analyses indicate that although
individual-level perceptions of current authorities and attitudes to other aspects of the
political system—e.g., its institutions—are related to one another, perceptions of
institutions appear to be empirically distinct from perceptions of current government
officials.9
This article is particularly concerned with general orientations toward political
institutions and elites, and based on these comparative analyses, it is assumed that
indicators of trust and confidence can validly tell us something meaningful about these
general orientations. Given that such items are, in fact, likely to tap into both types of
6support, in order to try to eliminate the likelihood that the findings here solely pertain to
specific support, this article (a) investigates multiple indicators of political trust to
determine how generalized our findings are across targets of trust and (b) controls for
known predictors of specific support. In terms of (a), the indicators of political trust
analyzed here refer to parliaments, politicians, and legal systems (see below). It would
not necessarily be expected that the predictors of trust in each of would be similar—
particularly trust in the legal system vis-à-vis parliament and politicians—unless they
were all tapping into general system support. In terms of (b), after controlling for the
known predictors of specific support, it is expected that any remaining covariance (once
these predictors are included in the model) is likely to tell us something about diffuse
support, although it must be acknowledged that the findings may ultimately refer to both
specific and diffuse support. Before discussing the measures of political trust further, the
article first outlines why it is expected that divisions over the impact of immigration on
the national community will be related to political trust.
Concern About Immigration and Political Trust
A distinguishing feature of modern states—particularly modern European states—is that
they were built upon notions of shared identity and values. While modern advances in
transportation and printing as well as increased state-led nation-building activities clearly
helped in the process of constructing national identities,10 some contend that “the
presence of a core ethnie around which strong states could be built” made the creation of
nations possible.11 That is, strong states have been built around shared cultural heritage
and norms. Research on modern perceptions of national identity points to the conclusion
that these identities, including their civic, ethnic and cultural components are still
7extremely relevant to citizens of European countries.12 In addition, social identity analysis
has highlighted the importance of identities—even artificially constructed laboratory-
based identities—and contended that they contribute positively to self-esteem and self-
image and help to provide clarity in a complex, confusing world.13 Established identities
like national identities would thus seem to be even more relevant and powerful than those
constructed in laboratories by social psychology researchers. For some, immigrants pose
strong threats to these identities by bringing with them seemingly different values and
ways of life; they may also be seen as threatening to the economic resources of fellow
countrymen and women.14 Newcomers who may be perceived as holding extremely
different values from those of natives—Muslim migrants vis-à-vis a predominantly
secular Britain or France, for instance—may be particularly difficult to reconcile with
existing national identities. In short, notions of nationhood and citizenship attempt to
distinguish those who belong and those who do not. This may have the effect of fostering
fear of those with whom we do not share common identity.15 In the modern mass-
immigration states of Europe, immigration also divides natives between those who
perceive the state as being unable to accommodate newcomers and those who believe that
it can accommodate such newcomers.16
The difficulty of coming to terms with new migrants and differences in
perceptions about whether newcomers are problematical for the maintenance of the
national society or not, in turn, have potential implications for political systems. Political
systems are thought to not work well if individuals in the system are not “sufficiently
oriented toward one another” and willing to support the existence of a group of
individuals who can negotiate and settle differences.17 Some research has already come to
the conclusion that immigration and multiculturalism may create problems for the former
8of these conditions (i.e., orientation toward one another), although it must be noted that
the evidence is somewhat mixed.18 Immigration, or more specifically, perceptions of the
impact of migration, may also create problems for the latter. That is, negative perceptions
of the impact of immigration may reduce willingness to support the existence of a group
of individuals who can engage in policymaking and willingness to support the institutions
through which these groups of elites govern. This is because feelings of disunity are not
likely to apply solely to feelings of citizens for one another but are also likely to extend to
feelings about the elites in this community and the way the community is governed.
Consistent with this idea is the fact that evidence already indicates that individuals tend to
be increasingly less favorable toward using the institutions of the state to reduce poverty
and provide welfare as a result of perceptions of cultural differences between groups who
access these services.19 Moreover, it has been argued that many European democratic
political systems have been layered onto pre-existing cultural connections—indeed, many
would contend that democratic political systems arose in Europe partly as a result of the
development of feelings of national community and the demands of this community for a
more representative political system.20 Thus, those who perceive that immigration is a
threat to this community are likely to feel a weaker connection to elites and institutions
which were originally designed to govern a national community. More specifically,
though, they are likely to distrust that elites and institutions are adequately protecting this
community from the potentially major changes to cultural composition and economic
competition that they perceive are likely to result from large-scale immigration. That is,
when it comes to immigration, those most concerned about it may feel that their political
system (the elites and institutions) has “sold out” (or let the public down) by failing to
9protect the national community from the potentially disruptive and divisive force of
immigration.
In sum, large-scale mass immigration clearly creates widespread concern about
political and social community and about social identities.21 Under pre-mass-immigration
conceptualizations of national identity to which many Europeans still subscribe, it is
assumed that the institutions through which elites governed the national polity were
designed to govern and adjudicate between members of the national community. If
individuals perceive newcomers as a threat to that community, the institutions that govern
these individuals are likely to be called into question: those most worried about the
effects of newcomers on the national community may question the extent to which
national political institutions exist to represent a national citizenry in the multicultural
state. In addition, individuals are likely to blame their political elites and institutions for
allowing large-scale migration in the first place and thus feel negatively about these elites
and institutions as a result. While some of the existing research mentioned above hints at
the connection between immigration and perceptions of political systems, there is still
only very limited academic investigation of this relationship.22 The analysis here takes a
step towards filling this gap. Thus, the first proposition to be investigated is as follows.
Proposition 1 Individuals expressing most concern about the impact of immigration
on the national community will be most distrusting of politicians and
political institutions.
Contextual Effects: The History of Migration and the Far Right
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Based on the discussion above, it might be expected that levels of migration would be
significantly related to political trust. However, in the past three decades all countries of
Western Europe have become countries of immigration. That is, they are all experiencing
high levels of influxes of economic migrants, asylum seekers, and other newcomers.
Historically, though, this experience has been extremely varied, with Southern Europe
and Ireland initially not being prime destinations for migrants; this began to change in the
1980s and 1990s, with Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece receiving large numbers of
migrants from North Africa and from Central/Eastern Europe in the case of Greece. In
recent years, Ireland has also become a key destination for immigrants.23 Thus,
ultimately, all of Western Europe now shares the experience of large-scale mass
immigration from outside of Europe, and so all West European nation-states are
presented with this same difficulty of how to incorporate newcomers into the polity. This
also means that all citizens of West European nation-states are likely to have had to come
to terms with their own feelings regarding whether newcomers are detrimental or helpful
to the national political and socio-economic systems. The limited effects of actual
immigrant numbers on these perceptions is reflected in the fact that actual numbers of
migrants to a country appear to have very little impact on perceptions of migrants in the
most recent decade, and a very limited relationship to perceptions of actual levels of
migration to the country.24 In short, given the now-shared experience across Western
Europe with large-scale migration and the vast divergence between actual levels of
migration and perceptions of migration, it is unclear as to whether actual levels of
migration should have an affect on perceptions of the political system either.
It is possible that the history of migration to the country will affect political trust,
though, and, more specifically, will affect the relationship between concern about
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immigration and political trust. Why might this be the case? The reasons for the expected
connection between concern about immigration and political trust outlined above
highlight a process in which citizens are becoming disconnected from their state
institutions because of increasing perceptions of non-nationals sharing in the state’s spoils
and eventually in its political decisions. This is not likely to be a sudden transformation
of perceptions, as, for instance, when individuals respond relatively rapidly to economic
downturns, but instead is likely to be a gradual process as generations of citizens come to
terms with the implications of immigration for their states. In addition, in longer-term
immigration countries, several generations of citizens have now had the opportunity to
reflect on their perceptions of the impact of newcomers on their societies. This, in turn, is
likely to reflect the lengthier public debates on the effects of immigration in these
countries, with citizens developing firmer views about whether immigrants are positive or
negative for the country and clearer perceptions of the implications of immigration for the
political system as a whole.25
Moreover, in terms of specific blame of government for allowing large-scale
migration in the first place, there is a significant difference between the longer-term
countries of immigration and the more recent countries of immigration regarding how
immigration to these countries began in the first place and why it continued in successive
periods. Namely, most of the longer-term countries of immigration actively engaged in
helping to recruit migrant workers. Thus, the reason for the existence of Germany’s large
Turkish population can be directly connected to government policies in the first instance;
the same is true for Britain’s Pakistani, Afro-Caribbean and Indian populations (although
colonial ties also played a part in the choice of recruitment centers in the case of Britain).
In addition, although there have been periods of economic recession in which these
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countries have (mostly unsuccessfully) attempted to halt the high levels of immigration,
there have also been periods of growth in more recent decades that have led governments
to allow further migration to fill gaps in the labor market. These policies can be
contrasted with those of the newer immigration countries, where there has been no such
active recruitment on the part of governments, with immigrants arriving for a very
different set of reasons, namely the rapid increase in economic development in these
countries, the increased difficulty at times of gaining access to the more developed
European countries, and in some of the countries, the large informal economy, which is
attractive to those travelling to Europe clandestinely.26 That is, there has not been an
active attempt by these governments to recruit labor from abroad, so it may be more
difficult for citizens to blame government policies for immigration. In this sense,
immigration is likely to be viewed as being something that simply happens, with people
having less of a clear or focused sense of government being culpable in this process.
Ceteris paribus, it is thus expected that the group of countries with longer histories of
post-war immigration may experience higher levels of political distrust than countries
with shorter histories of being countries of immigration and that this variable may
mediate the effect of concern about immigration on political trust.27 Therefore, the second
and third propositions to be investigated are:
Proposition 2 Individuals living in long-term “countries of immigration” will be the
most distrusting of politicians and political institutions.
Proposition 3 Individuals living in long-term “countries of immigration” and who
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are most concerned about migration will be the most distrusting of
politicians and political institutions.28
As mentioned above, far-right parties have been on the rise in Europe in great part
because of anti-immigration sentiment. Ivarsflaten, for instance, finds that the key factor
uniting successful right-wing parties in Europe is mobilization of anti-immigration
sentiment.29 Many of these same parties also attempt to mobilize hostility to “the political
class.” Thus, it is possible that (a) distrust in politics is higher where far-right parties have
managed to successfully wage such campaigns and that (b) the relationship between
concern about immigration and distrust in politics may be mediated by the mobilizing
ability of far-right parties. Therefore, the fourth and fifth propositions to be investigated
are:
Proposition 4 Individuals living in countries with a strong far-right presence will be
most distrusting of politicians and political institutions.
Proposition 5 The relationship between concern about immigration and political
distrust will be stronger in countries where there is a strong far-right
presence. 30
Note that the measurement of all these variables is discussed in the Appendix.
Political Distrust: Alternative Explanations
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It might be contended that any relationship found between concern about immigration
and political distrust is spuriously driven by other factors. The analysis controls for many
of these factors here. One that may be of particular importance is the individual’s general
outlook on life. For instance, it may be the case that some individuals are simply more
negatively disposed toward most ideas which they may encounter and so the coincidence
of negative perceptions of immigrants and negative perceptions of politics may be a result
of this more general negative predisposition or outlook.31 In addition, early research on
perceptions of politics pointed to factors like anomie, or normlessness related to personal
insecurity (which, in turn, is connected to a loss of intrinsic values that give meaning and
direction to life), in explaining attitudes toward politics.32 That is, it is perhaps not just
general pessimism that may explain negativity toward immigrants and toward politics but
also the more modern phenomenon of general alienation. Although the analysis is unable
to control entirely for these potential factors, it does control for general unhappiness and
dissatisfaction with life. In addition, controls are also included for the frequency of
meeting with friends, primarily as an indicator of social capital (see the discussion
below), but also because it is likely to capture some degree of alienation and thus anomie.
Existing academic literature points to several other explanations for differing
levels of political trust and distrust as well. The multivariate analyses below incorporate
controls for many of these variables. For instance, scholars have linked distrust in politics
to social capital, including voluntary and other informal participatory networks and
interpersonal trust.33 Controls for social capital are included in the multivariate models
below, using interpersonal trust and the frequency of meeting with friends as indicators of
social capital.34
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In addition, many researchers have pointed to the role of economics in explaining
differences in individual-level and aggregate-level perceptions of political institutions. If
the economy is performing poorly or if people perceive that the national economy or their
own personal economic circumstances are declining (or are likely to decline), support for
political institutions and leaders is likely to be reduced, at least in the short-term.35
Controls are therefore included for perceptions of national and personal economic
situations and actual economic circumstances at both the country- and individual-level
(see the Appendix).
Perceptions of the functioning of political institutions are also important: if
governments are perceived to be fair and open, if politicians can be held accountable, and
if individuals perceive governments to be performing well along various policy
dimensions, individuals are more likely to trust.36 In addition, one of the main findings in
recent analyses of attitudes to government institutions has been that the actual functioning
of political institutions has strong bearing on how individuals perceive those
institutions.37 Corruption, absence of the rule of law, poor public service provision,
inefficient bureaucracy, and institutional instability are likely to mean that citizens are
less trusting in political institutions and elites. Thus, where possible, controls for
perceptions of institutional policy performance and actual performance have been
included in the models below (see the Appendix).38
Analyses also point to the effects of being electoral “losers”—i.e., voting for a
party that fails to get into government—and indicate that electoral losers may lose some
degree of confidence in the political system, at least in the short-term, with winners
having a more positive attitude to the political system.39 Controls are therefore
incorporated for this variable.
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In addition, the models control for having voted for a far-right party in the most
recent general election, and left-right self placement. Taken together, these variables are
likely to be strong proxies for any potential automatic correlation between concern about
immigration and political distrust resulting from ideological confluence of these attitudes.
Left-right self-placement is likely to capture the potential ideological confluence between
political dissatisfaction and hostility to immigration, with those on the far-right expected
to be more negative about political institutions and politicians and about immigration,
and those who actually voted for the far-right are, of course, very likely to be hostile to
immigration and to politics because of ideas stoked by far-right party rhetoric (as
discussed above).
In terms of additional controls included in the analysis, it is possible that the long-
term-country-of-immigration variable is capturing cross-national differences other than
those intended. For instance, governance quality in the shorter term immigration
countries may, on average, be lower than in longer-term immigration countries. As noted
above, the analysis here controls for governance quality (again, see the Appendix for the
measure of this). In addition, the group of countries that have not been long-term
countries of immigration are likely to have a different level of welfare protection than
longer-term countries of immigration like Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and the
UK. That is, the long-term country-of-immigration dummy variable may produce a
spurious result because it is capturing differences in social welfare protection. A control
is introduced for this variable in the analysis below.
Thus, any relationship between concern about immigration and distrust in politics
that remains after including all of these controls is the relationship taking into account
these potential causes of spuriousness—general pessimism, alienation, automatic
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ideological confluence of political distrust and concern about immigration, including
individual-level support for the far-right, being an electoral winner, perceptions of
government performance, perceptions of the economy, and social capital. As discussed
above, the analysis further incorporates country-level data on the mobilizing effect of far-
right parties, thus controlling for this potential source of spuriousness as well. The
analysis further controls for household income, age, education, and gender.40 It is
expected that with the many predictors of specific support included in the model—
particularly winning and losing, perceptions of government performance, and perceptions
of the economy—at least some of the remaining covariation between concerns about
immigration and political trust will be connected to more general orientations toward the
political system and will not be solely limited to attitudes toward the current government.
The Analysis: Univariate and Bivariate
The analysis conducted in this paper is based on the European Social Survey, Rounds 1
through 4 (available at http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/).41 The dependent variable,
political distrust, is measured via an 11-point scale presented to respondents after the
following statement: “Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you
personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution
at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. [country]’s parliament? the legal system?
politicians?” The coding for these items was reversed so that high values represent higher
levels of distrust.42 As discussed above, if a relationship is found between concern about
immigration and political distrust across these multiple indicators of the latter, this will be
taken as a potential indication that the effects are unlikely to be limited to specific support
for the particular set of incumbents in power at the time of the survey (and this is
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precisely why the three indicators have not been combined into a single index here). Also
note that the analysis excludes the newer democracies of Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE) because it is likely that the survey questions about immigration capture a very
different phenomenon in the CEE countries than in Western Europe, particularly attitudes
to co-nationals coming from neighboring countries as a result of historical border
changes.43
Table 1 provides the means and standard deviations for each of the indicators of
political distrust.44 The overall mean scores indicate that distrust of politicians is higher
on average than distrust of parliament or the legal system. The means also point to
relatively higher levels of distrust of parliament in Portugal, Germany, and the UK, with
lower levels of distrust in Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, and the
Netherlands, providing some support for the idea that the relationship between political
distrust and actual levels of immigration is not likely to be very strong, as discussed
above.45 The cross-national differences in scores for distrust in politicians and the legal
system are roughly similar to those for distrust of parliament. In terms of individual-level
bivariate correlations between concern about immigration and distrust in politics
(analysis not shown), the average Pearson correlation coefficient between these is 0.29
(across all of the indicators of political trust), but this ranges from 0.38 for distrust in
parliament in Norway, with similarly high correlations in Britain, Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Sweden, to lows of 0.16 to 0.21 in Southern Europe and Ireland. The
Pearson correlation coefficients for politicians and the legal system have a similar pattern,
providing initial support for Proposition 3 (i.e., a weaker relationship between concern
about immigration and political trust in newer immigration countries). At the country-
level, the correlation between level of concern about immigration and political distrust
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(Pearson’s r) ranges from 0.51 in the case of distrust of the legal system to 0.70 for
distrust of parliament. That is, the relationship is fairly strong. This is compared to the
correlation between distrust of the European Parliament and concern about immigration,
for instance, which is only 0.20 and is not statistically significant (whereas the former
Pearson correlation coefficients are statistically significant). This implies that the
connection between concern about immigration and political distrust appears to be
limited to perceptions of national institutions. This may be taken as one indication that
the relationship between concern about immigration and distrust of national institutions
and politicians is not spuriously driven by general unhappiness, dissatisfaction, etc. since
the relationship between immigration concern and distrust of the EP should be as strong
as (or stronger than) the relationship between the former and distrust of national
politicians and institutions if another variable was driving the relationship.46
[Table 1 about here]
Multivariate Analyses
The multivariate analyses are conducted using HLM on the four rounds of the ESS.
Given that some of the variables discussed above are measured at the country level
(specifically, history with migration, far-right mobilization, economic conditions, quality
of governance, and level of social welfare protection), and that the four rounds of the ESS
have been combined, a technique that takes into account the potential underestimation of
standard errors because of lack of uniqueness across observations is required. Multi-level
modeling is used here to solve this problem,47 using a three-level model with the
individual at Level 1, variables that are measured at the country level and which vary
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across the four rounds of the ESS (country-round) at Level 2,48 and variables measured at
the country-level that do not vary across the four rounds at Level 3.49 In order to further
guarantee robustness, the analysis also controls for the ESS round using dummy
variables.
A model with none of the theoretical predictors included was first estimated, in
order to examine the variance components of the dependent variable. The model
examined is:
Distrustijk = π0jk+ eijk (1)
where
π0jk= β00k + r0jk
and where
β00k = γ000 + u00k
The top portion of Table 2 illustrates the variance components across the three indicators
of the dependent variable. As seen there, most of the variance in distrust across all
indicators of the latter is at the individual-level, with only 1 percent at Level 2 and 8-12
percent at Level 3. The remaining sections of the table illustrate the amount of variance at
each level that is explained with each subsequent model presented below.
[Table 2 about here]
The model containing the Level 1 independent variables to be estimated is as follows:
21
Distrustijk = π0jk+ π1jk Concern about Immigrationijk… + eijk (2)
Equation 3 illustrates the effect of Level 2 variables on the intercept of Equation 2.
π0jk = β00k + β01k Far-right Popularityjk + β02k Social welfare spendingjk + r0jk (3)
Equation 4 illustrates the effect of Level 3 variables on the intercept in Equation 3.
 β00k = γ000 + γ001Long-term Country of Migrationk + γ002Governance Qualityk +
γ003 GDP/capitak + γ004 Unemploymentk + u00k (4)
Equation 5 illustrates the effect of popular far-right parties on the slope of concern about
immigration in Equation 2:
π1jk= β10k + β11k Far-right Popularityjk +r1jk (5)
Equation 6 illustrates the effect of being a long-term country of migration on the slope of
concern about immigration in Equations 2 and 5:
β10k = γ100 + γ101Long-term Country of Migrationk + u10k (6)
Table 3 reports the coefficients for the three-level model excluding any interaction
effects. These results indicate that after controlling for fairly powerful predictors of
distrust in politics, concern about immigration has a statistically significant effect on
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distrust in politics, with maximum effects of 1.7 on the 11-point measure of distrust in
parliament, 1.3 on distrust in politicians, and 1.4 on distrust of the legal system. Other
relatively strong effects include dissatisfaction with the country’s economy, interpersonal
(dis)trust, and dissatisfaction with the health and education systems in the country. Indeed
the former of these (dissatisfaction with the country’s economy) has stronger effects than
concern about immigration across all three indicators of political distrust, and the strength
of the latter three variables is roughly similar to that of concern about immigration.
Amongst the weaker effects in the model are dissatisfaction with one’s personal income
and one’s actual income, the winner effect, voting for a far-right party in the most recent
general election, left-right self-placement, frequency of meeting with friends, general
unhappiness, dissatisfaction with life, household income, age, education, and gender (see
the Appendix for the range and coding of each of these). In short, although not the
strongest effect in the model, concern about immigration is far from being the weakest
either.
[Table 3 about here]
Perhaps more interesting is that concern about immigration continues to display a
significant relationship with political distrust after controlling in particular for
unhappiness, life dissatisfaction, voting for a far-right party and left-right self-placement.
This is important because—as discussed above—the latter two variables capture some of
the potential ideological confluence of the two issues of immigration and distrust that
have been witnessed in many European countries and the former two capture general
pessimism. That is, even after taking into account this potential automatic correspondence
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via voting for the far-right and via left-right self-placement, as well as pessimism,
attitudes to the economy, and attitudes to government provision of health and educational
services, the effect of concern about immigration on political trust remains.
Amongst the Level 2 and Level 3 variables, the only ones that achieve even the
most basic generally accepted level of statistical significance (p ≤ 0.05) are: social 
protection expenditure, which reduces distrust across all three indicators of the dependent
variable; being a long-term country of immigration, which increases distrust in
parliament, as predicted; and GDP/capita, which is (unexpectedly) associated with
increased distrust in parliament. Political distrust does not, however, appear to be driven
by the level of popularity of far right parties, quality of governance, or unemployment
level.50
The variance components results reported in Table 2 indicate that the model in
Table 3 accounts for approximately 19-24 percent of the variance in the dependent
variable at the individual level, 20-60 percent of the variance at Level 2 (country-round),
and 67-95 percent of the variance at Level 3 (the country level).
The hypothesized interactive effects discussed above will now be estimated.
Because of the potentially severe multicollinearity produced by including too many
interactive terms in the model (particularly since concern about immigration is included
in all of these interactions), each of the interactive effects discussed above—concern
about immigration interacted with the long-term country of immigration dummy and with
far-right popularity—was estimated separately. Tables 4 and 5 display the coefficients for
each of these interactive terms. Both interactions are statistically significant except in the
case of far-right popularity and distrust of politicians. The effects of these interactions are
displayed in Figures 1 and 2.51 The interaction between concern about immigration and
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being a long-term country of immigration is as predicted (Figure 1). In countries with
long post-war immigration experiences, differences over whether immigrants pose a
problem for the nation-state also seem to play a role in dividing those who have less or
more confidence in political institutions and elites. Note that the level of social welfare
protection also plays an independent role in reducing political distrust in these models.
[Tables 4 & 5 and Figures 1 & 2 about here]
For far-right popularity, there is very little difference between countries with
strong far-right parties and those without these parties, in terms of the relationship
between concern about immigration and distrust of politics. However, the relationship is
slightly stronger where there is a popular far-right party, as expected, and the effect is
most powerful in the case of distrust of the legal system (see Figure 2).52
The empirical analyses thus generally confirm Propositions 1 and 3, and provide
weak support for Proposition 5; Proposition 2 received support in the case of distrust of
parliament and Proposition 4 was not supported. Clearly then, divisions regarding the
impact of immigration on the national community do appear to divide Europeans
regarding their perceptions of the political systems, with those who think immigration is
having a detrimental effect on the national community also appearing to feel more
strongly that their national political systems are failing them. It is argued here that this is
likely to be because these political systems are perceived to be failing to carry out the
most basic of functions, protection of the national community. Those who feel more
positively about the impact of immigration, however, also remain more positive about the
political system as a whole. Moreover, the fact that the relationship holds for perceptions
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of politicians, parliament and legal systems indicates that the effect of concern about
immigration is likely to pertain to perceptions of the political system as a whole rather
than just to the individuals running the system or to elected institutions. In addition, this
effect is more pronounced in countries with long histories of post-war immigration,
where the impact of immigration presumably has been the subject of debate far longer
and where governments initially engaged in active recruitment of migrant labor. The
effect is also slightly more powerful in countries with a strong far-right presence,
although it is important to note that it also exists where the far-right is weaker as well.
Because of the potential for endogeneity here—particularly that the key
independent variable, concern about immigration, may, in fact, be caused by the
dependent variable, political distrust—an instrumental variables analysis has been
conducted using the first round of the European Social Survey, where adequate
instruments could be found for concern about immigration. The results of the multi-level
analysis using the instrumental variables confirm those reported above. (These results
will be provided upon request.) It should be noted that the author has also investigated the
issue of causal order in the British case using the panel component of British Election
Studies data for both 2001 and 2005 and these findings further confirm that causality
does run in the direction hypothesized here.53 The implications of these findings will now
be discussed in the conclusion.
Conclusions
This article has argued that one of the potential consequences of concern about
immigration is negative perceptions of political institutions and politicians and that this
relationship is not simply spurious and may not simply be a result of far-right rhetoric,
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pessimism or unhappiness. Instead, the construction of the modern European state, with
its emphasis on common culture and identity, has made it extraordinarily difficult for
many citizens in these states to reconcile the functioning of their national political
systems with the incorporation of newcomers who are perceived not to share the same
culture and values and are perceived to be having a negative impact on the economic
prospects of fellow countrymen and –women. That is, concern about immigration is not
simply accidentally or coincidentally related to political distrust but is likely to be one of
the causes of the latter. That the effects appear for elected officials and an elected
institution (parliament) as well as an unelected branch of the political system, the legal
system, provides some indication that these effects may not be limited solely to blame of
the current government of the day, but instead may pertain to more general system
support. The findings also indicate that this divide is stronger in countries with longer
post-war experiences with immigration.
Also of interest here are the weaker findings, particularly for the Level 2
variables. Namely, far-right mobilization appears to have more limited effects on the
relationship between concern about immigration and political trust than might be
expected. The relationship between concern about immigration and political distrust
appears to exist regardless of the presence or absence of powerful far-right parties,
lending further support to the argument of the paper, which is that many Europeans
generally have fears about the impact of immigration on their national communities and
that in many cases, this weakens their feelings of connectedness to their political systems
and elites and leads them to feel negatively about a political system that appears to be
failing to protect the national community. This relationship is not necessarily solely
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stoked by the far-right, but does seem to be stronger in countries with longer experiences
with post-World-War-II migration.
The effect of reduced trust, in turn is potentially very serious, in that positive
orientations toward political systems make governance possible, as discussed above. That
is, the perceived threat posed by immigration presents the prospect of some degree of
weakening of governments and governance because of the increasing disconnectedness
between political elites and institutions on the one hand and citizens on the other.
Some of the potential confounding explanations for this relationship deserve
further exploration in future research. For instance, it is possible that modern life is
increasingly associated not just with large-scale immigration but also with phenomena
such as alienation and anomie, which as discussed above, may be producing negative
reactions to immigration and to political institutions. Although the analysis presented
here has attempted to control for this possibility, more work on this could be done using
better indicators of these constructs. The same is true for personality factors and general
outlook like optimism and pessimism. In addition, it is important to note that the analysis
points to the conclusion that a higher level of social welfare protection helps to reduce
political distrust; it may thus be the case that government adoption of these types of
policies can ameliorate some of the negative effects of concern about immigration. More
work on this possibility could also be fruitful. At the very least, however, this article has
highlighted the need to consider the potentially negative effects that public concern about
immigration may be having on perceptions of political systems in Europe.
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Appendix: Measurement of Variables in the Analysis
Level 1 Variables (all in the European Social Survey, Rounds 1-4)
Distrust in politics Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you
personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution
at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly…READ OUT [country]’s
parliament? the legal system? politicians? The coding of these items was reversed such
that high scores represent distrust.
Concern about immigration Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s
economy that people come to live here from other countries? Please use this card. Bad for
the economy (0), Good for the economy (10). And, using this card, would you say that
[country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live
here from other countries? Cultural life undermined (0), Cultural life enriched (10). Is
[country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other
countries? Please use this card. Worse place (0), Better place (10) The coding of all three
of these items was reversed and the items were combined into a single index, with values
ranging from 0 to 10, which was the average score given by each respondent for all three
items. Inter-item correlation (Pearson’s r) ranged from 0.58 to 0.65. Average Cronbach’s
alpha was 0.83 (minimum alpha was 0.75 for the Netherlands). The items also load onto a
single factor in every country. Note that these items were chosen because they are the
ones available across all four rounds of the ESS. However, the items appear to capture the
main relevant concerns related to immigration—economic and identity concerns,54 plus
the more general worries about the impact of immigration on the country.
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Unhappiness: Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are? Please use
this card. Extremely unhappy (0) Extremely happy (10). The coding of this item was
reversed such that high values represent unhappiness.
Dissatisfied with life: All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a
whole nowadays? Please answer using this card, where 0 means extremely dissatisfied
and 10 means extremely satisfied. Extremely dissatisfied (0) Extremely satisfied (10).
The coding of this item was reversed such that high values represent dissatisfaction.
Social Capital: Frequency of meeting with friends Using this card, how often do you
meet socially with friends, relatives or work colleagues? Never (1) Less than once a
month (2) Once a month (3) Several times a month (4) Once a week (5) Several times a
week (6) Every day (7). The coding of this item was reversed such that high values
represent rarely meeting with friends.
Social Capital: Interpersonal (dis)trust A8 CARD 3: Using this card, generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful
in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be
too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted. A9 CARD 4: Using this card,
do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance,
or would they try to be fair? Most people would try to take advantage of me (0) Most
people would try to be fair (10). A10 CARD 5: Would you say that most of the time
people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves? Please use
this card. People mostly look out for themselves (0) People mostly try to be helpful (10).
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The coding of all three of these items was reversed and the items were combined into a
single index, with values ranging from 0 to 10, which was the average score given by
each respondent for all three items. Inter-item correlation (Pearson’s r) ranged from 0.48
to 0.58; Cronbach’s alpha was 0.76 and factor analysis confirmed that the items all load
onto a single factor.
Perceptions of Economic Performance Unfortunately, the ESS does not contain the
array of indicators necessary for distinguishing between pocketbook versus sociotropic
and retrospective versus prospective economic evaluations, so we rely on the following
two indicators of perceptions of economic performance. “On the whole how satisfied are
you with the present state of the economy in [country]”? Extremely Dissatisfied (0),
Extremely satisfied (10) The coding of this item was reversed such that high values
represent dissatisfaction; “Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how
you feel about your household’s income nowadays?” Living comfortably on present
income(1) Coping on present income(2) Finding it difficult on present income(3) Finding
it very difficult on present income(4).
Perceptions of Government Performance: Dissatisfied with health services and
education system Still using this card, please say what you think overall about the state of
health services in [country] nowadays? Extremely bad (0) Extremely good (10). The
coding of this item was reversed such that high values represent dissatisfaction. Now,
using this card, please say what you think overall about the state of education in [country]
nowadays? Extremely bad (0) Extremely good (10). The coding of this item was reversed
such that high values represent dissatisfaction.
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Winning and losing Respondents who claim to have voted for a party that was in
government at the time of the survey were given a code of 1; those who voted for parties
not in the government were coded 0. Note that in a handful of the counties, elections were
held in the midst of the ESS fieldwork. If the government changed after these elections,
then winning and losing parties subsequently changed for the purposes of coding this
variable, as appropriate.
Voted for far-right (anti-immigration) party in last general election Information
regarding which parties held opposition to immigration as one of their key party
platforms in each country and for the various years of the ESS was compiled as discussed
below, and respondents who claim to have voted for one of these parties in the most
recent general election before the conduct of fieldwork were given a code of 1; everyone
else was given a code of 0. If, as was the case in a few countries, an election was held in
the midst of the ESS fieldwork, the relevant election used for this coding changed, as
appropriate.
Other Controls
Left-right self-placement: In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right.” Using
this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10
means the right?
Household income: Using this card, please tell me which letter describes your
household's total income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources? If you
don't know the exact figure, please give an estimate. Use the part of the card that you
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know best: weekly, monthly or annual. Note that in the Cumulative Round 1-3 file, this
variable is coded on a twelve-point scale, where in Round 4, it is on a 10-point scale. To
provide better comparability, the variable has been standardized such that respondents’
scores represent the distance of their income categories from the mean value of the
survey.
Age: In what year were you born? (Mean age was 48; standard deviation was 18).
Education: What is the highest level of education you have achieved? (0= Not completed
primary education; 1= Primary or first stage of basic; 2= Lower secondary or second
stage of basic; 3=Upper secondary; 4=Post secondary, non-tertiary; 5=First stage of
tertiary; 6=Second stage of tertiary).
Gender: coded by interviewer; 0=Male and 1=Female.
Level 2 Variables
Strong Far-right Presence This was measured by the percent of the popular vote going
to a party that has opposition to immigration as one of its main platforms in the national
election preceding the fielding of the ESS questionnaire. Information about party
platforms was generally obtained from multiple online election resources, as well as
annual reviews of elections in the European Journal of Political Research. The full list of
far-right parties and percentages of votes received in the year before the ESS fieldwork in
each country and each round is available from the author, as is the full list of sources
used.
Social Welfare Protection This is measured by the total expenditure on social protection
per head of population in ecu/euro, in the year before each of the rounds of the ESS
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survey. Data are available from
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/social_protection/data/main_tables .
Level 3 Variables
Long-Term History of Immigration As noted in footnote 27, Greece, Spain, Portugal,
Italy and Ireland are given a code of 0 for this analysis and all other countries are given a
code of 1.
Quality of Governance To measure overall quality of governance, the analysis relies on
the World Bank Governance Indicators, which are based on surveys of household and
firm respondents, experts working in the private sector, NGOs and public sector
agencies.55 Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi define governance
as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised.
This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and
replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement
sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that
govern economic and social interactions among them. 56
There are six indicators of governance which are strongly correlated with one another,
with a minimum Pearson’s r of 0.60 for the period analyzed in this paper, with an average
inter-item correlation of 0.80 and Cronbach’s alpha of 0.94 and all items load onto a
single factor in a principal components analysis. The six indicators are thus combined by
taking the average score across all six for each country and each year. Note that
Rohrschneider has conducted extensive validation of several components of this index
and found them to be related to Transparency International corruption perception scores,
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with the number of European Court of Human Rights judgments against a country, and
with public perceptions of the conduct of elections in a country.57
Economic conditions GDP/Capita, measured using the average OECD GDP/capita as the
base is available from http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=NAG , and
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